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sell and an imperative direction to sell. That there is a
clear distinction is well settled.'
Each may be coupled with a trust to pay debts or
charges, but a discretionary power to sell is not, merely by
coupling it with such a trust, thereby converted into an imperative direction to sell "out and out," especially when
it is manifest that the primary object of the grantor of the
power is not to convert the land into money, but is to pay
debts or other charges, and such object may be accomplished
with better advantage to the estate by a mortgage. In
such case, particularly if the power is given by a will, such
a construction should be adopted as will most effectually
carry out the primary object of the testator; and if, under
the circumstances of the particular case, this can be done
with more advantage to the estate by a mortgage than by a
sale, then the power to sell should be construed as discretionary and not as imperative.
That a power to sell, though coupled with a trust to
pay debts or other charges, does not prima facie imply a
power to sell "out and out" is shown by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Phelps
v. Harris,2 where it was held that a power to "sell and
dispose of" property implied a power to make partitionof
it between the beneficiaries, even though there was a
further direction to "invest the proceeds." 3

Streme Court of Pennsylvania.

ROBB v. CARNEGIE BROS. & CO., LIMITED.
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas-TWhen equity
will restrain defendant in the use of his own land-when
plaintiff's only remedy is at law-Privateindustry not entitled to the immunities of a piublic servant-Afeasure of
danages-lVaturaluse of land.
10 U. S., 370.
'2 Perry Trusts (4th ed.), Sec. 507.
5
To the same effect is the recent English case of Frith z. Osborne,
L. R. 3 Ch. Div., 618; S. C. iS, Eng. Rep., 724.

STATEMENT OF Til-

CASE.

Where a defendant on his own land engages iii all industry which
causes physical injury to the adjoining land of the plaintiff, the defendant must respond in damages if the indu.try has no natural connection
with the soil or the subjacent strata.
Therefore, where the defendant's coke-oven emitted fumes which
impaired the plaintiff's crops, it was held to be no defence to an action
at law to aver that the site for the oven was selected with care, and that
no land was better adapted for coke-burning than the land in question.
I seems that on such a state of facts equity -would refuse to interfere
by an injunction, since such interference would amount to a suppression
of the coke industry.
But while equity will'recognize the importance of such an industry
by refusing to suppress it, the law, in spite of the importance of the industry, will treat it as a private enterprise, and will deny to it those illmunities which belong of right only to railroads and other public servants.
The measure of damages in such case is not the same as in condemnation proceedings, but is solely the actual harm which has resulted to
the plaintiff from the operation of the defendant's industry.

Appeal of Carnegie Brothers & Co., Limited, defendants, from the judgment of the Common Pleas of Westmoreland Couity in an action on the case brought by
Adam Robb to recover damages for injuries alleged to hive
been sustained in respect of his property by reason of the
operation of defendants' coke-ovens, from which ovens
offensive fumes, smoke and dirt were poured upon his
premises.
It appeared upon the trial that the plaintiff was the
owner of a farm adjoining the tract upon which the defendants' ovens were situated. He had acquired the greater
part of the farm prior to the defendants' purchase of their
tract, and had secured the residue more recently. The
plaintiff's witnesses testified that the soil on his farm was
limestone, part black loam, and all good. The defendants'
witnesses declared that it was "second-rate" soil and farbelow the average of that found in Westm6rland County's agricultural districts. The defendants' tract consisted of about
twenty acres of low ground, swampy, unfit for cultivation,
and overgrown with underbrush, willows and sycamores.
This piece of ground lay three hundred feet below the
plaintiff's land and nine hundred feet below the brow of
tile hill where the plaintiff's arable land began. It was a
secluded place, but well adapted for coke-burning by rea-
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son of its proximity to certain coal mines with which there
was convenient railroad communication. On this tract
the defendants erected coke-ovens and machinery of the
most improved kind to the value of $200, ooo. The plaintiff made no objection to the building of the ovens, but actually assisted in the work.
I The plaintiff called witnesses who proved a gradual
diminution of crops for six years prior to the bringing of
suit. There was also testimony to the effect that the plaintiff had lost timber and fruit trees, and that crops had
grown to a certain height and, in spite of fertilizers and
Evidence was offered on bemanure, had then died.
half of the plaintiff that damage to the extent of $io,ooo
had, in witness's opinion, been done to plaintiff's property by the erection of the ovens and by the smoke. The
admission of this testimony was made the subject of the
second assignment of error. Witness was also asked what,
in his opinion, was the market-value of the plaintiff's
property as affected by defendants' ovens. An objection
to the question was overruled, and the witness was permitted to answer. Third assignment of error. Witness
was further permitted to testify that, in his opinion,
plaintiff's farm could (but for the ovens) be utilized for
fruit growing. Objected to as irrelevant, both because it
had no relation to actual damage and because, in point of
fact, an orchard was planted on the farm, and the fruitbearing qualities of the trees were in evidence. Objection
overruled. Ninth assignment of error.
The only other assignments commented upon by the
Court (the seventh and the twelfth) are sufficiently set forth
in the opinion.
Verdict for plaintiff for $4,798. io. A motion for a
new trial was refused, and defendants took this appeal.
Paul H. Gaither, Esq., and John . Wentling, Esq.,
(J. A. Marchand, Esq., and D. A. Miller, Esq., with
them), for appellants.
George Shiras, Jr., Esq., W. F. McCook, Esq.,
P. C. Knox, Esq., and James H. Reed, Esq., representing various coke companies, filed an intervening argument
on behalf of appellants.
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James lL. Peoples, !,sq.,
with him), for appellees.

(D. S.

Atkinson,

lsq.,
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Opinion of WILLIAMS, J. October 5, 1891.
This case was tried with considerable care in the Court
below, and was in most respects well tried. Some questions were, however, raised and considered on the trial
which were not necessarily involved, and which hindered,
rather than helped, the Court and jury in reaching a correct result. For this reason, and because the case as it is
presented is one of considerable general importance, it
seems desirable that the position of the parties, and principles by which their relative rights are to be adjusted,
should be briefly considered. This may be done by answering the following questions: First, has the plaintiff
shown a cause of action for which he can recover in a court
of law? Second, if he has, what is the measure of his damages? Third, was the evidence which was admitted under
objection relevant to the issue before the jury?
The plaintiff shows that, prior to 1871, lie was the
owner of a farm in Westmoreland County, on the uplands
north of Brush Creek. His cultivated fields began about
i,ooo feet from and about 300 feet above the stream, and
extended back to and beyond his dwelling and farm buildings, which were about one-half mile from the stream.
He shows that, in 1871, the defendants bought a tract of
land in the valley, and extending up the slope some 300 or
4oo feet, on which they erected coke-ovens on the flat on
the north side of the creek. He alleges that the smoke
and gas from these ovens pass over his farm, injuring
thereby his crops, diminishing the productiveness of the
soil and the desirability of his house as a place of residence.
Evidence was given on the trial in support of this allegation.
The defendants deny that the plaintiff has suffered injury
in his crops, his soil or the comfort of his home, and they
further deny that the injuries alleged, if actually sustained,
would entitle the plaintiff to recover, and for this they give
the following reasons : (a) such injuries are the natural and
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necessary result of the development by the owner of the
resources of his own land, as in Sanderson v. the Coal
Company;' (b) they result from a reasonable use of his
own land for a lawful purpose, as in Huckenstein's Appeal ;2 (c) they result from the pursuit of a lawful calling
in a lawful manner, without either negligence or malice
on the part of the owner or his employees, as in Lippincott v. the Railroad Company.' In Sanderson's case the
land of the Coal Company was coal land, its value could
be realized by the owners in no other way than in bringing
the coal to the surface so that it could be prepared for the
market. In the process of mining, subterranean veins of
water are necessarily opened, and the water accumulating in the mines must be brought to the surface, where it
naturally finds its way into surface streams and pollutes
them. If this could not be done a great industry would be
interfered with, and the owner of the coal land denied the
rights of ownership of his land for the benefit of a neighboring owner whose title was no greater or higher than his
own.
The maxim, "Sic utere luo ut alienum non l&das,"

was, therefore, neither suspended nor modified in Sanderson's case.
The Coal Company was using its own land in the only
manner practicable to it. The harm done thereby to others
was the least in amount consistent with the natural and
lawful use of its own. If this use was to be denied to the
Coal Company because some injury or inconvenience to
others was unavoidable, then the result would be practical
confiscation of the coal lands for the benefit of householders
living on lower ground. But the defendants are not developing the minerals in their land or cultivating its surface. They have erected coke-ovens upon it and are
engaged in the manufacture of coke. Their selection of
this site rather than some other' is due to its location and to
their convenience, and has no relation to the character of
the soil or to the presence or absence of underlying minerals. The selection was, no doubt, a wise one, quite se1 113 Pa., 126.
*270 Pa., 102.
3 116 Pa., 472.
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cluded and quite convenient to the several mines from
which the materials were to be obtained for the making of
coke, but it was the selection of a manufacturing site,
and is subject to the same considerations as if glass or
lumber or iron had been the commodity to be produced
instead of coke. The rule in Sanderson's case has, therefore, no application to the facts of this case. The injury,
if any, resulting from the manufacture of coke at this site
is in no sense the natural and necessary consequence of the
legal right of the owner to develop the resources of his property, but is the consequence of his election to devote his
land to the establishment of a particular sort of manufacturing, having no natural connection with the soil or the
subjacent strata. The rule in Huckenstein's Appeal is
equally inapplicable. The land of the appellant in that
case had upon it a deposit of fine brick clay which could
be made into bricks with profit, if this was done near the
pit from which the clay was taken. This is the usual, and
probably a necessary, way of converting the clay into brick.
An effort was made to enjoin against the burning of the brick
by Huckenstein on the field where the clay was obtained.
The injunction was refused, and it was held that upon the
case as presented Huckenstein was making a reasonable
use of his own land which equity would not interfere with.
Whether he would have been liable in an action at law for
any substantial injury he might do to a neighbor by the
burning of bricks, was not before the Court, and was not
considered. We think it is true, as held by the Judge of
the Court below, that the evidence in this case would not
justify an injunction. It shows a selection of a site as well
adapted to the business and as remote from dwellings as
any in that region. To enjoin the manufacture of coke at
such a site would amount to a prohibition of its manufacture, and the destruction of vast allied and dependent industries of immense value to the public, as well as to those
directly engaged in them. An injunction is not of right,
but of grace, and will never be issued by a court of equity
when it will inflict a greater injury than it will prevent.
In such a case the injured party will be left to his redress
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at law. No more than this is fairly covered by Huckenstein's case. The plaintiff in this case is, therefore, in the
right court, and if he is substantially hurt by the use to
which the defendants have seen fit to devote their land, we
see no reason why he may not recover, unless it is found
in the last of the positions taken by the defendants, for
which Lippincott's case is cited.
It is a fundamental principle of our system of government that the interest of the public is higher than that of
the individual, so that, when these interests are in conflict,
the latter must give way. If the individual is thereby deprived of his property without fault on his part, he is
entitled to compensation; but if he is affected only in his
tastes, his personal comfort, or pleasure, or preferences,
these he must surrender for the comfort and preferences of
the many. Thus highways are necessary to the public
business and comfort. Some noise and dust are necessarily
occasioned by the. legitimate- use of them. This may be
disagreeable; perhaps, in some cases, positively harmful to
some one or more of the persons living along them; but
for this there is no remedy at law or in equity. It is one
of the necessary consequences of subjecting the individual
to the public in those things as to which their interests are
Railroads have become the great highways of
in conflict.
The turnpike and canal have been
travel and commerce.
superseded, and the people and their products are transported at a great advance in speed and comfort over the
modern highway by the power of steam. The law recogTheir
nizes the public character of these highways.
presence is necessary to the prosperity and comfort of the
public. To some persons who live near them, as to some
persons who live upon a busy city street, the incessant roar
of business and the dust of passing vehicles or trains may
be unpleasant or painful, but whether such persons live
upon a country road, a paved street, or a railroad, they are
alike remediless. No action will lie against the municipality, the turnpike or the railroad company for the noise
and dust caused by the legitimate use or operation of the
highway in either case. For negligence or malice, the
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wrongdoer is liable to the party injured; but for the lawful
use of the road in the customary manner, no liability
attaches to the traveller or owner. The railroads are built,
as is the turnpike or the street, under.laws regulating their
construction and use, in the interest of the public which is
to be served by them. The right to operate railroads is a
necessary incident to the right to build them, and this was
held in Lippincott's case. But the production of iron or
steel or glass or coke, while of great public importance,
stands on no different ground from any other branch of
manufacturing or from the cultivation of agricultural products. They are needed for use and consumption by the
public, but they are the results of private enterprise, conducted for private profit and under the absolute control of
the producer. He may increase his business at will or
diminish it. He may transfer it to another person or
place or State, or abandon it. He may sell to whom he
pleases, at such price as he pleases, or he may hoard his
productions and refuse to sell to any person at any price.
He is serving himself in his own way, and has no right to
claim exemption from the natural consequences of his own
acts. The interests in conflict in this case are therefore
not those of the public and of an individual, but of those
of two private owners, who stand on equal ground as
engaged in their own private business. Lippincott's case
is, therefore, no reply to the plaintiff's case.
What, then, is the measure of damages? The declaration charges an injury to the trees and crops growing on
the surface, and a permanent injury to the soil by the
deposit upon it from the passing smoke and gas of sterilizing and poisonous substances. To the first of these the
statute of limitations was properly applied. During two
of the six years open to inquiry the farm was in possession
of a tenant who paid what is admitted to have been a full
rent for it. The crops for those two years should, therefore, be excluded from consideration. As to the remaining
four years, if the crops were so affected as to reduce their
quantity or value, the shrinkage upon each year's crops
should be shown in bushels or tons, or approximated as
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nearly as possible. For the acreage in wheat or corn in
any one of these four years, for example, being shown, and
the yield per acre, a comparison of the crop with that raised
on the same before the ovens were built, could be made,
and, so far as the difference was shown to be due to the
smoke or gas, it would afford some basis for an estimate of
the damage sustained on that year's crop. In this manner
the actual injury to the crops, if any, could be gotten at
pretty nearly. As to a permanent injury to the soil by the
deposit of injurious particles upon it, a chemical analysis
will afford the only safe guide. Differences in the amount
of the crop might be due to the effect of the smoke on the
growing plant, to negligent tillage, to exhaustion of the
soil by long cropping, or from many other causes; but if,
as some of the witnesses have testified, a crust of foreign
and sterilizing substances has been deposited over this
firm, varying from a quarter to a third of an inch in thickness, specimens of it can and should be produced, and its
composition, and the effect of its presence, ascertained and
explained to the jury by those competent to speak on the
subject. This is a question susceptible of a clear and satisfactory solution by the application of scientific tests,
which the Court and jury should have the benefit of. If
the result is to show a permanent injury to the soil, which
impairs its productiveness to an appreciable degree, the
extent of the loss in the value of the farm can be readily
computed. If such permanent impairment is not made to
appear, this part of the plaintiff's claim should be rejected
altogether. The fact that the.plaintiff may regard his farm
as less desirable than before, because of the proximity of
an undesirable business, or an undesirable neighbor, or the
further fact that its selling value has been reduced by reason of such proximity, affords no ground for a recovery.
The location of a livery stable, a restaurant, a distillery,
and many other kinds of business, close to one's home,
might diminish its comfort and its market value, but the
owner would be without legal redress so far as the effect
of proximity is concerned.
If, however, the business was so conducted as to affect
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the use of adjoining property or the health of its occupants,
these tangible and substantial injuries, capable of measurement by a pecuniary standard, might sustain an action for
damages. The ordinary rule for the ascertainment of damages where land has been entered and appropriated under
the right of eminent domain, does not furnish a measure
of the plaintiff's right to recover in this case, for the reason
already given. Where an entry and seizure has been made,
the effect of the seizure and appropriation of the part of the
land of the owner to a particular use is to be considered,
as well as to the value of what is taken. This can be best
adjusted by ascertaining the selling value of the whole
property before the entry, and after it has been made.
The difference, if any, shows the actual loss which the
owner has suffered. But in this case there has been no
entry upon, or appropriation of, the plaintiff 's land. What
he alleges is that the prosecution of the business of making
coke by the defendants on their own land has hurt his
crops and injured his soil. They have the right to make
coke. If the establishment of that business near the plaintiff affects the selling value of his farm, he can no more recover for that than he could recover against the saloonkeeper or the liveryman, because the location of their business near him had made his property unsalable. The nature of the business is therefore to be left out of the view.
The sole question is, What harm has been done the plaintiff
by, or as the direct result of, the prosecution of the defendants' business at a place where they had a legal right to
carry it on? The plaintiff might honestly think, and his
neighbors might be willing to testify, that the mere location of the ovens on adjoining land reduced the value of his
farm thirty or fifty per cent., or more, and a comparison by
them of the value before and after the building of these
ovens would include this element, for which there can be
no recovery. What has been now said substantially disposes of our question relating to the testimony objected to.
The second assignment of error is sustained. The question
objected to should have been excluded because it called for
no fact, but for a lumping estimate, which opened the way
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for the witness to introduce considerations that we have
seen had no place in the adjustment of the damages.
The question referred to in the third assignment
should have been excluded, for reasons already given.
The seventh assignment is also sustained. It was of no
sort of consequence where the defendants obtained the
material which they used in making coke, or what price
they paid for it, or what the miners who brought it to the
surface were paid for mining it, and such questions should
have been excluded. The ninth assignment must also be
sustained. The question was not what purposes the plaintiff might have devoted his farm to, and what damages he
would have sustained in that case, but to what purposes
had he devoted it, and to what extent had he been interfered with by the defendants' business.
An examination of the evidence shows that the plaintiff purchased his farm, containing eighty-two acres, for
$4,ooo, a few years before the ovens were built.

Several

years after they were built he'bought twenty acres adjoining, which contained coal, which he mined and sold to the
employees of the defendants. So far as the evidence indicates, the latter piece was not farmed, but kept and used for
mining coal.
For the injury to four years' crops, and for permanent
injury to his soil, the plaintiff recovered nearly $I,ooo.
more than his farm cost him, and still finds it to his advantage to reside upon it and to cultivate it. The fact that
such a verdict was rendered shows that the Court and jury
must have been misled, to some extent, by the irrelevant
testimony and by the improper measure of damages which
the jury was left to apply.
It only remains to consider briefly the twelfth assignment of error. The learned Judge said to the jury : "After
much thought, we have arrived at this conclusion: First,.
that the owners of coal land may develop and operate the
same, even to the injury of adjoining land-owners, without
remedy on the part of the latter, unless malice or negligence be shown; second, that a court of equity will not
restrain the operation of works of an injurious nature where
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the best possible place to do the least injury to others has
been selected ; third, that while equity will not restrain,
law will give a remedy where actual, positive, serious injury has been done to another by bringing upon adjacent
lands, and manufacturing, material not part of the land,
whether such harm be done to health or property."
We
cannot see that the appellants were hurt by this instruction. The first proposition is no more than a statement
of the rule which was held in Sanderson's case. The
second is all that the appellants could ask, and, as a general rule, is well settled.
If there is any error in the
third, it is in the concession that the mine-owner is under
less obligation to his neighbors when he makes coke upon
the tract from which the coal is mined than when he
makes it elsewhere. If this concession was mistaken, as
perhaps it was, it did not lay any burden on the appellants,
and they have no right to complain of it. Whether one
who mines coal, or petroleum, or lead, on his own land has,
by virtue of that fact alone, a right to manufacture or refine such product on the tract from which it was obtained
under circumstances which would prevent its manufacture
or render him liable for damages if he manufactured on
some other tract, is a question not raised by the facts of
this case. If the relation of the miner to his product, or
the surface to the underlying materials, could confer exemption from liability for the consequences of the manufacture of the material, mined where the process was conducted on the same tract, the defendants were not within
range of such exemption. They did not mine the coal
they used. It was not mined upon the land upon which
the coke-ovens stood.
They were, therefore, under the
general rule, and not within the exemption, if such exemption really exists. At the same time the location of these
parties and the industries of the region are not to be lost sight
of. The plaintiff's farm is in a region in which bituminous
coal is obtained in large quantities. He himself mines
coal upon his own land for sale. The conversion of coal
into coke, to supply fuel for the great iron and steel mills
of Western Pennsylvania, is one of the greatest industries
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of the region. Many millions of money are invested in
it, and many thousands of men are employed about its
production. It has been largely instrumental in the development, growth and general prosperity of the region.
The plaintiff shares the general benefits, and seems to possess some advantages that are special and grow directly out
of the establishment of these works near him, for he has
been thereby provided with customers for his coal and his
farm-products at his own door.
These considerations should be borne in mind in adjusting the damages, if any have been sustained, so that
the plaintiff, while he recovers for his actual loss*in the
products of his farm, or the destruction of his soil, as the
evidence may show the facts to be, shall not be allowed exemplary damages, and so that the defendants shall not be
treated as wrongdoers in the establishment of their plant
on a well-selected and secluded tract of land belonging to
themselves.
As this case goes back for a new trial, it is quite proper
for us to add that the trial judge is, in an important sense,
the thirteenth juror, and when the amount of the verdict
shows that it must have been arrived at by the adoption of
an erroneous measure of damages, or a mistake in computation, he should not hesitate to set it aside.
The judgment is reversed, and a venirefacias de novo
is awarded.
The principal case is a valuable
case, involve large commercial inaddition to the long line of deterests and great sums of invested
cisions which explain and qualify capital. Indeed, the pecuniary or
the oft-quoted maxim: Sic uere commercial importance to one litituo ut alienum non ladas. To gant of a decision favorable to himself often so clearly outweighs the
what extent is one to be restricted in
the use of his own land by the pro- disadvantage and discomfort which
hibition "Thou shalt do no hurt
would in that event be caused to
to thy neighbor "-a
prohibition
his adversary, that the courts are
which lies at the very foundation
always tempted to give controlling
of the law of Torts? Pollock on
weight to what may be called the
Torts,* 12. This is the question
"argument of expediency," and in
which the courts are constantly
some instances they have yielded
called upon to answer, especially
to the temptation. But in general
in cases which, like the principal
the courts have looked beneath the

THE NATURAL USE OF LAND.
surface of the question before them
and beyond the facts in a particular
case, and have recognized that the
point for decision is not, in a given
case, whether a great industry shall
be sacrificed to a neighbor's whim,
but whether or not the act of which
the plaintiff complains is a violation of the sacred property-rights of
a fellow-citizen. Accordingly, our
readers cannot fail to read with
especial satisfaction that portion of
the opinion of Mr. Justice WILLIAMS, in which, after admitting
that in proper cases the individual
must yield his interest to the public
good, he uses the following significant language: "But the production of iron or steel or glass or
coke, while of great public importance, stands on no different ground
from any other branch of manufacturing, or from the cultivation of
agricultural products.
They are
needed for use and consumption by
the public, but they are the result
of private enterprise, conducted for
private profit and under the absolute control of the producer. He
may increase his business at will or
diminish it. He may transfer it to
another person or place or State,
or abandon it. He may sell to
whom he pleases, at such price a.
he pleases, or he may hoard his
productions and refuse to sell to
any person or at any price. He is
serving himself in his own wa-.
and has no right to claim exemption from the natural consequences
of his own acts. The interests in
conflict in this case are, therefore.
not those of the public and of an
individual,but those of two private
owners, who stand on equal ground
as engaged in their own ptivale
business."
This portion of the decision is
valuable fron the fact that it does

away with extraneous matters
which might influence the judgment, and makes it possible to examine the point of law which the
case really decides. That point, as
stated above in the syllabus, is that
where the defendants' coke-oven
emits fumes which impair the plaintiff's crops, it is no defence to an
action at law to aver that the site
for the oven was elected with care,
and that no land was better adapted
for coke-burning than the land in
question.
The reason for this decision is
well expressed in the judgment of
the Exchequer Chamber in Fletcher
v. Rylands (L. R. I Ex., p. 278).
In the course of his opinion, which
was in terms adopted by the House
of Lords, BLACKBURN, J., said:
"The person whose grass or corn is
eaten down by the escaping cattle of
his neighbor, or whose mine is
flooded by the water from his neighbor's reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbor's
privy, or whose habitationis made
unhealthy by thefumes and noisome
vapors of his neighbor's alkali
works, is damnified without any
fault of his own, and it seems but
reasonable and just that the neighbor who has brought something on
his own property, which was not
naturally there, harmless to others
so long as it is confined to his own
property, but which he knows to
be mischievous if it gets on his
neighbor's, should be obliged to
make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But
for his act in bringing it there, no
mischief could have accrued; and
it seems but just that he should at
his peril keep it there so that no
mischief may accrue, or answer for
the natural or anticipated conse-
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quences. And upon authority, this,
we think, is established to be the
law, whether the things so brought
be beasts, or water, or filth, or
stenches."
Although some emphasis is here
laid by the learned judge upon the
bringing of the injurious agency
upon defendants' land, it is clear
that the liability of the defendant is not understood to depend
upon such a state of facts. Indeed,
in Fletcher v. Rylands the defendant did not bring the water upon
his own land; it flowed there naturally, and all he did was to utilize
it by the construction of a reservoir. See the report of the case in
3 Hurlstone & Coltman, 786. Accordingly, effect must be given to
the language of Lord CRANWORTH
in the House of Lords: "If a person
brings or accumulates on his land
anything which, if it should escape,
may cause damage to his neighbors,
he does it at his peril." The reason for the decision, then, rested
upon the fact that the defendant
had accumulated water for the purposes of a reservoir, which, as Lord
CAIRNS pointed outwas " a non-natural use" of the land. Fletcher v.
Rylands and the principal case are,
therefore, both authorities for the
proposition that a defendant will be
liable for damage caused by the
escape of a substance (water in the
one case, and coke fumes in the
other), provided the substance is
not liberated in the course of a
natural user of his land by the defendant. The question whether or
not the elements of a nuisance were
present in one case and not in the
other, *oes not concern us now.
The question at once arises, What
is a natural user of land? In addition to deciding that coke-burning
is not a natural use, the Court, in
the principal case, in referring to
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its own earlier decision in Penna.
Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 P. S.,
126, incidentally decided what does,
in its judgment, constitute such a
use. "In Sanderson's case," says
WILrjAMS, J., "the land of the Coal
Company was coal land. Its value
could be realized by the owners in
no other way than by bringing the
coal to the surface, so that it could
be prepared for the market."
Again, in referring to the case before him, the learned Judge remarked: "But the defendants are
not developing the minerals in their
land or cultivating its surface."
And again: "The injury, if any,
resulting from the manufacture of
coke at this site, is in no sense the
natural and necessary consequence
of the exercise of the legal rights
of the owner to develop the re"sources of his property, but
is the
consequence of his election to devote his land to the establishment
of a particular sort of manufacturing, having no natural connection
with the soil or the subjacent
strata." It seems, therefore, that
a use of land to be a natural use
must have a necessary connection
with the soil or the subjacent strata.
This statement is substantially in
harmony with the language of Lord
CAIRNS in Rylands v. Fletcher (L.
R. 3 B. & I. App. Cases, p. 339).
Now, the purpose of determining
in a given case whether a use of
land is natural or not is, generally
speaking, to ascertain to what extent the end which the defendant
has in view justifies the means; or,
rather, to ascertain whether or not
the defendant is liable for the results of the means which he employs. Thus, in Rylands v. Fletcher
(supra), and in the principal case,
as soon as it appeared that the use
was non-natural, the -Court found
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no difficulty in holding the defendant liable for damage actually done,
although the damage followed inevitably from the use.
Is the converse of this rule sound
law? Does the fact that a use is
natural justify acts which cause
damage merely because the acts are
essential to the use? An examination of the cases seems to show
that there is a conflict of authority
on this point. Generally, it may be
said, the converse of the rule does
not hold good. The weight of
authority is to the effect that acts
done in the natural use of land
which cause damage to the property of a neighbor are protected
only when the damage results from
the operation of purely natural
forces upon the injurious substance.
Or, to say the same thing in other
words, a plaintiff cannot complain
of the injuries which result when
natural forces, acting upon the injurious substance, cause it to leave
the position which it occupied when
found by the defendant and cause
it to come in contact with the plaintiff's property. In short, the immunity of the defendant depends
upon the presence of two elements:
(i) the use of his land must be natural; (2) the agency which transports the injurious substance from
its original position to the plaintiff's property must also be natural.
The question has usually arisen in
reference to the mining of coal; and
the earliest case on the subject,
Smith v. Kenrick (7 M. G. & S., 515;
62 E. C. L., 1849), involved the
rights of owners of adjoining collieries.
In that case the defendant's colliery adjoined the plaintiff's, but
was situated upon a higher level.
One consequence of this fact was
that a large body of subterranean

water was prevented from flowing
into the plaintiff's workings only
by a large horizontal bar of coal, all
of which bar was part of defendant's
colliery. A corresponding barrier
upon the plaintiff's land had previously been removed by a trespasser,.
so that the defendant's barrier was
the plaintiff's only protection. The
defendant, although he knew what
the result would be, proceeded to
remove this bar for the purpose of
obtaining coal, and so working his
mine in the manner most advantageous to himself. As soon as the
bar was removed the water flowed
into the plaintiff's mine, and he
But
forthwith brought his suit.
the Court held that if the plaintiff's
barrier had not been removed he
would have been as amply protected
as if Lie defendant had not removed
his, and that the defendant, as he
might then have mined up to the
very boundary line, could not now
be restricted in consequence of anact forwhich he was notresponsible.
He was therefore discharged from
liability; and this decision was said
to be in harmony with the civil law
by which it was considered that
land on a lower level owed a natural servitude to that on a higher, in
respect of receiving, without claim
to compensation, the water naturally flowing down to it (Dig. Lib.
39, tit. 3). That the decision is a
direct authority for the statement
of the law as made above appears
from the language of CRESSWELL,
J., in contrasting the facts before
him with those in Haward v. Bankes
Says the learned
(2 Burr, 1113).
Judge (p. 563): "There can be no
doubt that a man may cause water to
flow from his own premises into his
neighbor's so as to make himself
In
liable to an action ........
this case it ought not to be said that
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he caused,but that hefpermitted,the
water to flow into the plaintiff's
mine."
In Baird z'. Williamson (15 C. B.
[N. S.] 376; io8 E. C. L., 1864), the
defendant and plaintiff were owners
of adjoining mines, the mine of the
former being, as in Smith v. KenWater
rick, on a higher level.
came into the plaintiff's mine from
two sources, and for one the defendant was held liable, and for the
other he was not. This is therefore
a peculiarly instructive case. Part
of the water flowed from openings
made by the defendant on his own
premises for the purposes of obtaining the mineral, and as to this
the Court said (p. 390): " The owners of the higher mine have a right
to work the whole mine in the usual and proper manner, for the purpose of getting out any kind of'
mineral in any part of that mine;
and they are not liable for any water
which flows by gravitation into an
adjoining mine from works so constructed." Part of the water came
from a source lower than the plaintiff's mine, but was raised by pumps
to a higher level, so as to enable the
defendant to reach other mineral
lying at a greater depth. Referring
to this the Court says (p. 391): "In
respect of this water we think the
action lies. The defendants, as occupiers of the higher mine, have no
right to be active agents in sending
water into the lower mine......
If, while the occupier of a higher
mine exercises that right [i. e., the
right to mine minerals in the usual
way], nature causes water to flow to
a lower mine, he is not responsible
for this operation of nature."
Crompton v. Lea (L. R. 19 Eq.,
115, 1874) was a case in which the
plaintiff's bill alleged that the defendants, in operating the mine,
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proposed so to excavate as to admit
the waters of the river Douglas,
which would inevitably flow
through the workings of the defendants into the plaintiff's mine.
The bill further alleged that the
proposed excavation was not for
any legitimate mining purpose,
and as this allegation was confessed
by the defendants' demurrer, the
demurrer was overruled. This case
is therefore an authority for the
statement as above made, that both
the elements of immunity must be
present; not only must the influx
of water be produced by natural
forces, but it must be in the course
of a user which is legitimate and
natural. In Smith v. Fletcher (L.
R. 9 Ex. 64, 1874) a defendant in
working his mine made cuts to carry
surface water, which but for the cuts
could never have reached the plaintiff's mine. In consequence of exceptionally heavy rains, the water,
under the operation of the law of
gravitation, found its way into the
plaintiff's mine, and the Court (reversing the trial judge) held that
it was a question for the jury
whether the mode of working the
mine was reasonable and proper.
In Wilson v. Waddell (L. R. 2
App. 95, 1876) it was distinctly
stated in the House of Lords by
Lord BLACKBURN that the question before the Court in Smith v.
Fletcher and Compton v. Lea was
not involved in the case under conSo no difficulty was
sideration.
felt in deciding that the defendant
was discharged from liability where
mineral workings had caused a
subsidence of the soil and a consequent shedding of rainfall into the
plaintiff's Jower coal field.
In Vest Cumberland Iron and
Steel Co. v. Kenyon (L. R. ix Ch.
Div., 1879) there was a substantial
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recognition of these principles.
The case itself was a curious one,
because, although it was admittted
that the defendant's operation was
not in the due course of mining, it
was yet contended on his behalf
that no more water had, as a consequence of his act, found its way
into plaintiff's mine than would
have flowed there if his act had not
been done at all.
The Court was of opinion upon
the evidence that such was the fact,
andjABEaS, L. J., in stating the limitation on the defendant's right to
deal with water in his mine, used
the following language (p. 786):
"When he ceases dealing with it
.he is not
on his own land .....
to allow or cause that water to go
upon his neighbor's land in some
other way than the way in which it
had been affected before."
The principles which underlie
these cases are not, to the writer's
knowledge, questioned in anyjurisdiction excepting Pennsylvania.
In that State the Supreme Court
has gone the full length of declaring that wherever the defendant
makes a natural use of his land he
is not liable for damages which inevitablyresult fron that use. This,
it will be observed, is the converse
of the rule recognized in Rylands
v. Fletcher and in the principal
case. Accordingly the elements of
a defendant's immunity in Pennsylvania must be said to be (i) that
the use of the land shall be natural;
(2) that the act causing damage to
the plaintiff should be necessary to
the use. It is not sufficient to show
that the injurious act is one which
is advantageous to the defendant, or
that it will facilitate his operations:
it must be necessary and unavoidable.
This doctrine was first announced

in the well-known case of the
Penna. Coal Co. v. Sanderson (113
P. S., 126, x886). This case had
come before the Court three times
before, and on each occasion the
decision was favorable to the plaintiff. Finally, however, the earlier
decisions were overruled, and the
Court, by a majority of four judges
to three, established the doctrine as
above outlined.
In that case the plaintiff depended
for a portion of his water supply
on a stream which had its source in
a swampy region at the bottom of
the slope on which the defendant
coal company subsequently sank
its shaft. In mining for coal, large
quantities of mine water were encountered, and it became necessary
to remove the water or to stop the
work. As the water would not
flow away under the operation of
natural forces, it became necessary
to use artificial means of getting
rid of it. Accordingly pumps were
called into requisition, and the water
was thus raised to the mouth of the
shaft. There all interference with
It was allowed to
it ceased,
take its course, and, flowing naturally down the slope, it contaminated the sources of the plaintiff's
stream, which thus became unfit
for use. The Court upon these
facts decided that the plaintiff's
damnum must be considered as
absque injuria. All the English
cases summarized above were referred to by the Court, and so much
of the decisions as related to the
natural use of land was approved.
But the Court did not hesitate to
depart from them where it became
necessary to justify the use by the
defendants of artificial means of
disposing of the water. The Court
declared that the defendants had a
right to rid the mine of water, pro-
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vided that they led it "into the
streams which form the natural
drainage of the basin in which the
coal is situate, although the quantity as well as the quality of the
water in the stream may thereby
be affected " (p. i49).
It thus appears that not only did
the Court realize the necessity of
confining the right of the defendant to acts absolutely unavoidable
in the natural use of the land, but
they were compelled to define the
It
meaning of "unavoidable."
was argued that the defendant
might have dug a tunnel to another
basin, or made a surface-drain to
some distant point, but the Court
perceived that such a course would
only transfer the injury instead of
preventing it. Perhaps, also, the
danger of sanctioning such a device
impressed them So they decided,
as indicated in the last quotation,
that no cause ofaction would accrue
to one who suffered loss in consequence of the operation of
natural forces upon water which
had been raised to the mioutth
of the mine, the earlier cases
having limited the immunity to
the operation of those forces upon
the water where it was first discovered. No valid reason occurs to
the writer why gravity should be
selected as the factor by which to
determine who should bear the loss
when once an artificial agency has
intervened. But probably the result will, in the long run, be as satisfactory as if any other arbitrary
determining factor had been selected. Unfortunately, however,
the appeal to a "natural" force
left room for the contention made
by the Court that the decision was
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in harmony with the current of
English authority already considered.
The limitation of the effect of the
decision in the Sanderson case was
recognized by the same court in
Collins v. Chartiers Valley Gas Co.
('3' P. S., i43), and the reader will
note the language of Wir,3L.AMS, J.,
in the principal case in referring tothe Sanderson decision: "In the
process of mining, subterranean
veins of water are necessarily
opened, and the water accumulating in the mines must be brought
to the surface, where it naturally
finds its way into the surface
streams and pollutes them. If this
could not be done, a great industry
would be interfered with, and the
owner of the coal land denied the
exercise of the rights of ownership
on his land for the benefit of a
neighboring owner whose title was
no greater nor higher than his
own."
This, then, is in outline the
present state of the law relating to
the natural use of land. Criticism
is foreign to the province of the
annotator, but it may be proper to
suggest that there is here the material for a valuable essay. Such
an essay might, among other
things, re-examine the legal significance of the term "the natural
use of land." If the Sanderson
decision is adhered to, it may hereafter be necessary to hold that cokeburning is a natural use of a remote
and barren field, and that coal-mining is not a natural use of a tract
of land so limited thatthe necessary
drainage of the mine can be accomplished only at the expense of one's
neighbor.

